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ABSTRACT The wide adoption of virtual learning environments such as Moodle in numerous universi-
ties illustrate the growing trend of e-learning development and diffusion. These e-learning environments
alter the relationship between the students and academic knowledge and learning processes considerably
stimulating the students’ autonomy by making most of the course material freely available at any time while
inducing a progressive reduction of physical student-teacher interactions with virtual ones. Recent advances,
as proposed in the TeSLA project, even introduces an e-assessment environment. This entire virtual learning
framework raises new concerns in terms of privacy, given that such environments are potentially able to
track the students, profile their habits, and retrieve personal data. In this paper, we analyze the influence of
conception paradigms of e-learning platforms on personal data protection, based on a classification of these
platforms in two antagonistic approaches. We illustrate our analysis with a case study of the TeSLA project
and examine how the design choices impact the efficiency and legal compliance of personal data protection
means. We finally propose alternative designs that could lead to significant improvements in this matter.
INDEX TERMS E-learning, privacy, data protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The transformation of educational environments over time is
often regarded mostly as a technological evolution, aiming
to improve the accessibility of students to course material
as well as to encourage interactivity with teachers. Indeed,
many universities have already integrated e-learning plat-
forms, such as Moodle, to enhance the educational content
of their courses. However, such evolution also entails deeper,
more fundamental changes in the relationship between stu-
dents and academic knowledge.
In particular, some institutions have chosen to fully
embrace this change by specializing in online education.
These so-called open universities are attempting to deploy
bachelor and master degree programs in all subjects taught
in traditional universities with certification. The latter raises
logistical problems related to the very nature of online activ-
ities characterized by spatial and temporal asynchronity (stu-
dents carry them out at different times and places). These
concerns lead to a lack of legitimacy of remote certification,
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perceived as unreliable to prove the presence and absence of
cheating, which these institutions hope to counterbalance by
the development of an innovative system.
E-learning systems, and even more so e-assessment sys-
tems, are potentially subject to privacy issues. Remote
authentication of students requires exchanges of personal data
that must be carried out within the legal framework provided
for in this respect. The objective of this article is to show with
the help of a case study how an e-assessment system can be
associated with such concerns. The analysis will be placed at
the level of the technical object during its development, and
will be comprised of sociological, legal and technical aspects.
Our analysis will be illustrated with an e-assessment sys-
tem called TeSLA (Adaptative Trust-based e-assessment Sys-
tem for Learning), designed through a H2020 project funded
by the European Commission. This system relies on several
anti-cheating countermeasures which consist in the real-time
gathering of several biometric samples to ensure the authen-
tication of the learner during the whole remote assessment
session. This process allows the university instructors to be
convinced of the learner’s identity when grading the assess-
ment. However, biometric samples are regarded as highly
64110
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sensitive data, from both ethical and legal points of view.
Therefore, on top of normalizing the use of biometrics in
an academic context, the choices made in the conception
of this framework lead to an extremely large collection by
the TeSLA system of various biometric samples from all
enrolled learners, which should necessarily come with strong
guarantees regarding the justification and the processing of
such sensitive data. Analyzing this process implies regarding
these choices as an attempt to manage users (both learners
and teachers) in a way that could lead to some unintended
outcomes in terms of privacy, even from the point of view
of the system designers, as pointed out in a seminal work by
Suchman [27].
Indeed, our approach stands in the middle of a naive vision
supposing the validity of the development approach without
questioning it, and of a deterministic vision that would picture
the developers as careless about privacy issues. Our idea is to
approach the TeSLA system, our case study, as a contingent
result of a set of social variables that nevertheless gives us
indications on the normativity specific to these online learn-
ing and examination systems. Our analysis actually relies on
the premise that technologies are not inert and disembodied
devices, and that they embody a set of norms (representa-
tions of what a good student is, of what cheating is, etc.)
that influence the behavior of their users [10]. Technical
choices always involve social and even political choices as
they empower, or conversely disadvantage, the people getting
in touch with them.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a
brief state of the art on approaches for the development of
e-learning tools, under sociological and technical perspec-
tives. Section III presents the legal framework on data pri-
vacy, particularly at the European level. Section IV describes
the TeSLA use case and describes the architecture of the
project. On the basis of this description, Section V highlights
the privacy issues raised by this project due to its funda-
mental choices. Section VI proposes alternatives to the cur-
rent TeSLA architecture to highlight the impact of different
choices on data protection and privacy. Section VII concludes
the paper.
II. APPROACHES ON E-LEARNING PLATFORMS
A. SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS
The purpose of this section is to highlight the two major ways
of thinking about the technical innovation that has recently
accompanied the development of e-learning and e-assessment
systems. These are especially reflected in an article by Feen-
berg andHamilton [13], which illustrates themwith examples
from the early days of e-learning in the modern sense of the
term (via online information exchanges).
On one hand, Feenberg and Hamilton pinpoint what we
could call today the mainstream learning management sys-
tems that have an initial aim, which is often information
spreading. The approach is not sensitive to the different con-
texts of e-learning, systems are seen as a tool that teachers are
going to be familiar with regardless of their study field or ped-
agogical method. The two authors describe this system as
based on behaviorist assumptions that strongly imbued the
e-learning of the time (and that still have a clear influence
today). The technology aims to pre-define the behaviors to
be generated. Here, the best way to accommodate spatial
and temporal asynchrony is to make the student’s behavior
calculable via various indicators, thus indirectly encouraging
them to self-manage.
One the other hand, Feenberg and Hamilton are giving
an insight of a context sensitive systems. During the early
days of e-learning, the idea of such systems, called WBSI,
has been developed on the fact that e-learning differs from
traditional learning, as the first implies only temporally and
geographically asynchronous relations between professors
and students. WBSI’s principal objective was to widen com-
munication possibilities allowed by these technologies. The
system was thought in an inclusive way toward different
teaching methods. There was no preconception of the defini-
tive goal of the system, which made its development rich in
terms of newness but chaotic in terms of implementation.
These two distinct approaches are similarly found in
the dichotomy drawn by the anthropologist Suchman. In a
famous fieldwork [27], she explains how engineers first pre-
suppose what the so-called plans of future users are. These
correspond to the precise way in which users must use a
technical object to meet a predetermined objective. It is an
optimistic projection of the designer, since users often rein-
terpret this plan in their own way, sometimes leading to
unexpected results. The aim is to ensure that a predictable
standard mode of use of the object is imposed on everyone.
In line with this approach, and in the context of the expansion
of e-learning technologies, we aim to analyze unintentionally
induced uses of a system conceived to legitimate the remote
assessment of learners, and the impact of such unplanned uses
on data protection and users’ privacy.
According to Suchman, engineers generally use this devel-
opment mode while a second way of doing things exists. This
different approach is intended to be more open, an objective
is defined upstream but does not prefigure the exact way
to achieve it. The final use of the object is not predictable,
which makes it more adaptable according to the circum-
stances encountered. This philosophy of innovation is based
more on experimentation than on the achievement of a goal.
B. TECHNICAL ASPECTS
Related work in the literature reports existing models and
platforms for electronic examination of learners. These sys-
tems focus on the need to objectively authenticate students
at a distance in order to overcome the concerns about the
legitimacy of e-assessment faced by universities. Two recent
approaches can be mentioned:
• Services like Safe Exam Browser and Secure Exam
may require the installation of dedicated software into
learners’ computers to take remote assessments. The
software controls the execution of unauthorized actions
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during the exam, such as executing multi-task applica-
tions, web connections, etc. From a pedagogical point
of view, this type of solution has negative effects on the
learners, creating stress and affecting the results of the
examination [2].
• An alternative approach is the use of Proctor-based
assessments. Human proctors are selected by the learn-
ers, whose main responsibilities include face-to-face
monitoring of learners, combined with some technolog-
ical solutions, such as web cameras and voice services,
during the execution of special examinations. Online
services such as Kryterion, ProctorU and Pearson VUE
rely on this type of approach. The main drawbacks of
these solutions consist in the technical scalability issue,
as well as the lack of authorship guarantees [14].
Overall, such approaches are flawed with a few limitations,
the most noticeable being the lack of a continuous process
relying on solutions addressing authentication and authorship
as a whole. These limitations constitute the main technical
challenges that the TeSLA project aims to address.
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON PRIVACY
The General Data Protection Regulation [23] (hereafter
GDPR) is the new European tool to ensure the protection of
personal data. It aims at modernizing the legal framework and
strengthening the responsibility of the data controller, defined
as the entity that determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data. According to Article 4.1 of the
GDPR, personal data refers to "any information relating to
an identified or identifiable natural person; an identifiable
natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indi-
rectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as
a name, an identification number, location data, an online
identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical,
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity of that natural person".
The GDPR applies to the processing of personal data
wholly or partly by automated means, and to the processing
other than by automated means of personal data which are
part of a filing system or are intended to be part of a filing sys-
tem (defined as any structured set of personal data accessible
according to specific criteria). The GDPR may apply even
where neither the controller nor the processor (defined as
the natural or legal person which processes personal data on
behalf of the data controller) are established on the territory of
the European Union. It will be the case when the processing
concerns the offering of goods or services irrespective of
whether a payment of the data subject is required to such data
subjects in the Union or if the monitoring of their behavior as
far as their behavior takes place within the European Union.
The GDPR recalls the following principles established in
Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data: transparency, purpose limitation,
data minimization, accuracy, storage limitation, integrity and
confidentiality.
This section aims to present the main aspects of data pro-
tection regulation that apply for e-learning activities. Indeed,
the implementation of a system such as TeSLA involves the
processing of a large amount of personal data that receive a
particular attention from the GDPR. To follow our analysis,
the institutions are considered as data controllers, and TeSLA
is the data processor.
A. PRIVACY BY DESIGN
Privacy by design is a newly formalized obligation introduced
by the GDPR to reinforce these data protection principles.
The concept of privacy by design already existed in the
previous Directive 95/46/EC, but now, its implementation is
clearer and formally mandatory in specific circumstances [1].
This imperative requires the data controller to ensure that
the system put in place is compliant with the fundamental
principles of personal data protection. In addition, the GDPR
encourages the technology to follow the movement in order
to ensure effective protection of the personal data. In other
words, it is about thinking the process differently. This is no
longer a question of developing a system and then mending
rules. The logic is reversed: the architectural design of the sys-
tem and the different algorithmic operations must integrate
in themselves the guarantees of data protection, at all stages
of the processing of the personal data from the collection
to the deletion or anonymization after a specified retention
period. By an a priori integration of legal norms, the objective
pursued by the European legislator is to reverse a situation
in which the development of technology precedes the legal
constraints.
In addition to be a binding obligation for the data controller,
the GDPR intends to go further by encouraging product
manufacturers, service providers and application producers to
take into account the data protection right when developing
and designing their products or services. The notion of data
protection by design receives an echo in the recent modern-
ization of Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals
with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, which
is the first and only international instrument concerning data
protection.
If privacy by design was at first a legal concept at which
legislation and case law paid attention to, it became a genuine
obligation. Indeed, Article 25 of the GDPR states that the
data controller has to implement appropriate technical and
organizational measures, both at the time of the determination
of the means for processing and at the time of the processing
itself. Each institution that wants to integrate e-learning tools
must have a clear policy concerning the rules of access,
the situations justifying a processing, the time of storage,
the confidentiality as well as the security by avoiding a single
point of failure and a proliferation of storage locations that
could lead to the loss of control over personal data [12].
B. MINIMIZATION OF PERSONAL DATA COLLECTION
The starting point in the conception of a system compliant
with the data protection law is the principle of minimization
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provided in Article 5 of the GDPR. This principle imposes
to only collect personal data that are adequate, relevant and
limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for
which they are processed. This implies that the data con-
troller considers the data that are strictly necessary to achieve
its purpose and promote the use of anonymized or at least
pseudonymized data. For example, one of the major objec-
tives for the institutions using e-learning is to be able to have a
strong identification of the students. Note that a minimization
policy does not apply solely to the amount of data collected,
but also to the number of people who can access and process
the data and the retention period [12].
This legal principle of minimization can receive two tech-
nical implementations. Firstly, the data controller should
design his or her database expurged of any personal data not
strictly necessary in order to accomplish the goal pursued.
Secondly, it is also possible to select — initially — the
data strictly necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
announced and — in a second step — to add personal data
in order to ensure and maintain the integrity of the developed
system. This second approach tries to legitimize the collec-
tion and processing of additional personal data for ensuring
the security and correctness of a system. If both approaches
are potentially valid, they must nevertheless be applied in
accordance with all the principles of the GDPR.
The second approach consists of a balance between two
legal principles: data minimization and security. While it is
true that security requirements are, for the first time, raised
as a real principle within the GDPR, it must be empha-
sized that the law only requires proportional security to the
risks through the use of appropriate measures. Consequently,
the collection of additional personal data to those strictly
necessary to achieve the objective of the system requires a
case-by-case analysis depending on the operating of the tool,
the nature and the volume of data as well as the risk to rights
and freedoms for the data subject. If the data controller can
reasonably consider the collection of additional personal data
to verify the identity of the person in order to guarantee a
safe processing, the Article 11 of the GDPR demonstrates the
overall philosophy of the data protection law. This provision
describes the situation where the identification of the data
subject is not required. If the purpose for which personal
data are processed does not or does no longer require the
identification of a data subject, the data controller is not
obliged to maintain, acquire or process additional informer
in order to be able to identify the data subject [29]. In any
case, it appears that the collection of additional data must be
transparent and the concern for security must be raised to the
rank of a specific purpose.
It implies that each institution determines, prior to the
collection of personal data of the students, the informa-
tion really necessary for the fulfillment of the educa-
tional activities. Each institution must decide whether it is
really necessary to combine several biometric recognition
tools or whether this can enhance the security of proper
identification.
However, the possession of some personal data may be
particularly intrusive in relation to the data subject privacy,
and requires a specific regime. For instance, personal data
revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, reli-
gious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership,
and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the pur-
pose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning
health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sex-
ual are considered as sensitive data. The processing of such
personal data is, in principle, prohibited, but this prohibition
does not apply if the data controller, for example, receives the
explicit consent of the data subject (Article 9.2 of the GDPR
lists several possibilities to process sensitive data).
C. PRACTICAL STEPS FOR COMPLIANCE IN SYSTEM
CONCEPTION
In order to respect the privacy by design principle, the data
controller has to define beforehand a data processing purpose.
The second step is the determination of the personal data
strictly necessary to achieve this purpose. The condition of
necessity covers two realities: on the one hand a quantitative
necessity and, on the other hand, a qualitative necessity.
Although it is important to avoid collecting too many data
in relation to the objective pursued, it is just as important to
verify that the collected data, even in a very small quantity,
by their nature, are not qualitatively excessive. This means
that it must be determinedwhether the processing of data does
not unreasonably infringe the rights and freedoms of the data
subject in relation to the benefits that the data controller could
obtain.
This double check is essential when a data controller con-
siders using sensitive personal data, such as biometric data.
Firstly, it is important to consider the relevance of using
sensitive data to achieve the purpose. Secondly, if the col-
lection and processing of sensitive data are relevant, the data
controller has to realize a qualitative necessity and consider
what sensitive data will be collected and processed. For
example, to authenticate users in a system, the data controller
has to identify if it is relevant and proportionate to process
both facial and vocal recognition in order to authenticate the
user, when facial recognition alone might be enough. The
controller must then operate a delicate and careful balance
between efficiency and restriction of the intrusion into the
privacy of the individual.
The data controller must also respect the minimization
principle and have a strong justification for the processing
of biometric data. In other words, the data controller has to
demonstrate that there is no other option. However, in that
case, the data controller has to put in place all the technical
and organizational measures surrounding the processing of
sensitive personal data to counteract the interference into data
subject privacy while ensuring the confidentiality of these
data [9]. In particular, the data controller has to enforce a
strong policy for the access to the biometric data and to have
procedural rules to check log files.
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IV. USE CASE: THE TeSLA PROJECT
As mentioned previously, the TeSLA project (Adaptive Trust
e-Assessment System) [28] is a EU-funded project that aims
at designing an e-assessment architecture in order to allow
learners from various universities to take remote examina-
tions, while deploying the necessary countermeasures to pre-
vent cheating. Thus, e-assessment takes existing e-learning
environments one step further, since traditional e-learning
systems, such as Moodle, are primarily designed to offer
learners a restricted access to course material. In this section,
we present an overview of the TeSLA projects and present
the designed architecture, before focusing on the security and
privacy issues raised in the context of this project.
A. OVERVIEW OF TeSLA
The objective of the TeSLA project is to provide an online
environment to take remote assessments with enough anti-
cheating countermeasures to guarantee a legitimacy of the
e-assessment equivalent to that of traditional examinations.
These countermeasures are comprised of various features
such as real time biometric authentication and authorship
verification.
Compared to the other existing e-assessment projects
described in Section II, the TeSLA framework aims at cover-
ing several security requirements by combining technologies
such as biometrics, digital certificates and trusted time stamp-
ing [20]. The biometric modalities on which authentication
relies in the context of TeSLA include keystroke detection [4],
[24], face recognition [26] and voice recognition [18]. The
authorship of learners is addressed with plagiarism detection
solutions [5], [11]. By combining these various approaches
for identification, authentication, and cheating prevention,
TeSLA aims at building a strong trust in the assignments
submitted by the learners.
B. THE TeSLA ARCHITECTURE
The architecture that has been designed and implemented
during the TeSLA project allows secure interactions between
the traditional e-learning environment, and the e-assessment
environment. The former is by nature tightly linked to the
university, while the latter is independent from the institution.
Therefore, the TeSLA architecture can be divided into two
domains: the university on one side, and TeSLA on the other
side, each domain being comprised of various components,
described hereafter. The global TeSLA architecture is repre-
sented on Figure 1.
The TeSLA domain is composed of three main elements:
• The TeSLA E-assessment Portal (TEP), whose role is
to acts as a service broker, receiving and forwarding
requests to other TeSLA components.
• The TeSLA Portal, whose role is to compute statistics
related to the e-assessment activities.
• Several instruments, whose role is to provide anti-chea-
ting countermeasures.
It is worth nothing that the aim of the instruments is either
to analyze the learner’s biometric samples sent during the
e-assessment in order to provide a feedback to the instruc-
tors, or to perform a post processing of the assignment, e.g.
with an anti-plagiarism tool.
Regarding the university domain, the following elements
can be listed:
• A Virtual Learning Environment (VLE), which corre-
sponds to the environment offered by a traditional Learn-
ing Management System (LMS) such as Moodle.1
• Aplugin integrated to the VLE, which offers a client side
interface with the TeSLA domain.
• A number of tools added to the VLE, that send requests
as well as data to the TeSLA domain through the
plugin. These tools can be sorted in three sets: one
learner tool, one instructor tool, and various external
tools. Instructors prepare and submit online assessment
using the instructor tool, while the learners take these
e-assessments via the learner tool. External tools are
meant to sample the learner’s biometric modalities and
to send them to TeSLA, where they will be redirected
to instruments for analysis and evaluation, as a way to
ensure real time authentication during the assessment.
• The TeSLA Identity Provider (TIP), which is an entity
that converts the learner’s real name into a randomly
generated identifier, called TeSLA ID , in order to pre-
vent any component of the TeSLA domain to know the
learner’s identity.
As mentioned above, the TeSLA architecture is illustrated
in Fig. 1. All the exchanges between the many components
are secured by the TLS protocol [7], which is deployed on the
whole architecture with mutual authentication. The purpose
of securing the data exchanges with the TLS protocol is on
one hand to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the
data, and on the other hand, to make sure that no one is
impersonating any of the components in the architecture. The
underlying Public Key Infrastructure for the TLS manage-
ment in the TeSLA architecture is explained in [17].
A classic scenario of a learner taking an e-assignment can
be summed up as follows. First, the learner has to log in on the
VLE where the client-side plugin has been integrated. Then,
the learner requests the e-assignment through the learner tool
available on the VLE. Before sending the request to the
TeSLA domain through the TEP, the real name of the learner
is replaced by the TeSLA ID obtained from the TIP. Then,
the TEP fetches the e-assignment in its database and sends
it back to the VLE. Finally, the learner can start to take the
e-assignment while the external tools regularly gather bio-
metric data, sent to the TeSLA instruments in real time. Once
the e-assessment is over, the instructor will be provided with
the analysis results of the biometric samples, as well as with
the e-assignment to grade.
The biometric data gathered through the external tools
can be as varied as keystroke dynamics, voice and face
1https://moodle.org/
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FIGURE 1. Simplified TeSLA architecture representation.
recognition. Keystroke dynamics consists in a real time mea-
surement of the learner’s keystroke frequency all through
the e-assessment, to be compared with a test sample built
during an enrolment phase. Similarly, voice samples and
face pictures can be gathered by TeSLA at regular intervals.
An algorithm then compares the collected biometric data to
the preexisting samples, and for each sample, a feedback is
provided on the teacher’s page with a score indicating the
computed level of trust.
C. PRIVACY MANAGEMENT IN TeSLA
Ensuring privacy consists in minimizing the personal infor-
mation retrieved by the TeSLA system during its interactions
with the learners, while anonymizing the data exchanged and
stored in the databases whenever practical [6]. The TeSLA
architecture provides the learner with pseudonymized identi-
fiers, which hide the learner’s genuine identity when taking
e-assessment activities.
Yet, in the context of e-assessment, full anonymity can-
not be provided to learners. Indeed, the very nature of the
notion of assessment requires to grade identified students,
and makes it mandatory to store the association between
the TeSLA ID and the real name of the learner. Therefore,
in such context, anonymity can only be partial. In other words,
only pseudonymity can be provided to learners when taking
an e-assessment. Indeed, since the association between the
learner’s true identity and the TeSLA ID is stored in the
TIP database, any claim of anonymization is impossible,
even though the learner’s identity is never transmitted to the
TeSLA domain.
The TeSLA ID is a random number computed by the
TIP following version 4 of the UUID standard [19]. The
TIP database shall be shared with all the VLEs. Since any
interaction between the university domain and the TeSLA
domain involves the client-side plugin and the TEP, ensuring
pseudonimity only requires that all requests sent to the TEP
are first redirected to the TIP in order to obtain the learner’s
TeSLA ID .
Regarding sensitive personal data, the most crucial aspect
of this platform has to do with the management of the
biometric samples. Indeed, as highlighted in Section IV-B,
several types of biometric data are gathered in real time
from the learner during the e-assessment process. These data
are transmitted over a secured TLS channel to the TEP in
the TeSLA domain, for analysis and comparison with the
enrolled samples.
The samples themselves are usually not accessible to the
instructors, which imposes a boundary on the availability
domain of such sensitive data. Only the results of the samples
analysis are returned to the teacher’s page on TeSLA, provid-
ing only an estimation of the trustworthiness of these samples.
However, though not designed as a feature of the original
architecture, it was eventually made possible for a teacher
facing samples with poor matching rates to gain access to the
doubtful biometric samples. This choice was made in order
to avoid punishing honest learners because of false positives.
Though adding a human factor before coming up with the
final decision to punish a learner for cheating undoubtedly
helps to reduce the risks of punishing a honest learner, it raises
serious issues regarding how easy it becomes for a teacher to
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gain access to sensitive data such as biometric samples. Such
issues are discussed next.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE TeSLA PLATFORM
A. IMPACT ON LEARNERS AND ASSESSMENT
The purpose of the TeSLA platform is to provide an
e-assessment platform with strong anti-cheating countermea-
sures, while at least partly ensuring users’ privacy. Therefore,
TeSLA primarily aims at addressing the lack of legitimacy
of online assessments due to the multiple cheating possi-
bilities, that include impersonation. By choosing to exclude
any human interaction during the assessment, the platform
shifts the burden of authentication to the learners themselves,
imposing various rigid constraints such as real time biometric
sampling.
Rather than focusing on alternative assessment practices
that would minimize the requirements on personal data,
TeSLA rather grants universities the possibility to propose all
kinds of exams to their learners, with various requirements on
the types of biometric modalities to be sent to the system, all
while taking potential disabilities of the learners into account.
By doing so, learners are left with very little margin in their
way to use the system. Similarly, instructors have to design
exams in accordance with the features of the TeSLA system,
in order to make sure that enough types of biometric modali-
ties will be retrieved for the authentication of the learner. Both
of them are guided by the technical features implemented in
TeSLA, thus corresponding to the plan concept developed
by Suchman [27], mentioned in Section II. Similarly, TeSLA
aims at keeping track of the learners’ activity in real time,
extending the numerous possibilities for learners’ activity
surveillance in current e-learning platforms such as Moodle,
where authentication allows the teachers to know exactly
when, e.g., a learner is logged in or when he accessed course
material.
Another aspect of TeSLA that is worth highlighting has
to do with the conception of cheating. First, the system
relies on the implicit assumption that taking an e-assessment
without cheating requires being alone. Though the system
is not able to guarantee that the learner is alone in the
room (another person may be present behind the camera for
example), the focus on face and voice recognition shows
that the system is intended to replace classic examination
instead of designing new examination practices, e.g. team
work based assessment. Second, in a system such as TeSLA,
anti-cheating countermeasures are all focused on detecting
impersonation. Contrary to classic exams, where cheating
mostly consists in accessing unauthorized sources of knowl-
edge, TeSLA cannot check if a learner is browsing the Internet
in search for answers. However, the instructors taking part in
the project are well aware of this situation and accept it as part
of the e-assessment process, which constitutes a significant
evolution in the conception of assessments.
It should be emphasized that students have to give their
explicit consent before taking an e-assessment that will gather
biometric samples from them, hence leaving them the choice
to refuse the remote test. However, TeSLA itself provides
no guarantee regarding the consequences of a refusal from
a learner. Therefore, whether or not other it can be replaced
with a less intrusive assessment, or with a face to face
exam, entirely depends on the university, which could lead
to consent being given by learners less freely than originally
designed.
Finally, in a context where the sampling of biometric
modalities is still under strong law regulation (and empha-
sized by the GDPR, as detailed in Section III), a system so
heavily based on biometrics such as TeSLA might take part
in normalizing the mass collection of biometric samples by
institutions over the years, in that learners will tend to regard
such practice as more commonplace than it is now, which
could be a significant source of evolution regarding people’s
relationship with their personal data.
B. PRIVACY ISSUES
Although TeSLA provides guarantees regarding privacy, such
as relying on a TeSLA ID , several issues can still be raised.
As explained in Section IV-C, the TeSLA ID allows learn-
ers to hide their identity to the TeSLA components, thus
ensuring pseudonymity during e-assessment activities. How-
ever, it is not enough to prevent the acquisition and corre-
lation of personal data by the TeSLA system. For example,
the TeSLA ID does not ensure multi-session unlinkability,
since the e-assessment system is obviously able to knowwhen
the same learner is logging in over two different sessions and
track his activity even without knowing his identity.
Such flaw in the learner’s privacy could lead to function
creep, i.e. unintended treatment of sensitive data first col-
lected for benign purposes. An example would be learner
profiling that might be exploited to infer which learners are
more likely to cheat, hence generating a bias in the system
by considering the overall matching score of the learners’
samples as objective representation of their likelihood to
cheat, similarly to Porter’s description of the emergence of
quantitative data in social sciences [25]. Moreover, it should
be reminded that the quality of the samples will vary from
one learner to another depending on the quality of their own
equipments. Therefore, it should not be excluded that learners
with less costly, but less sophisticated devices are more likely
to produce doubtful samples, and might therefore be more
prone to be regarded as suspicious by the system. On top of
creating a potential bias in the analysis of the samples, this
issue may therefore also indirectly leak private information
regarding the learner’s standard of living.
Though such profiling is not implemented in TeSLA as
part of the current project, no technical countermeasures have
been added to prevent such future evolution. Such concern
about the possibility of function creep is justified by the
numerous controversies related to the extension of the way
biometric data are used in various systems, as highlighted
in [21].
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Due to the fact that privacy filters were not clearly defined
from the very start of the project, some uncertainty remained
regarding the treatment and exploitation of the biometric
samples gathered by TeSLA, and automatically analyzed by
the instruments in order to provide feedback to teachers.
These samples were supposed to remain strictly confined to
the TeSLA domain, but as stated in Section IV-C, a sample
that has a lowmatching ratio will lead the teacher to check the
sample in person, and judge if it was a false positive or not.
Such leak of sensitive data from the TeSLA domain to the uni-
versity domain creates an important issue in terms of ethics,
and makes it technically possible for teachers to exploit these
biometric data at their own will, which is highly questionable
with respect to the GDPR requirements, and stems from the
lack of privacy by design development process as advised by
the GDPR. Moreover, since biometric samples are gathered
at a relatively high frequency, any learner is extremely likely
to produce at least one bad sample during an e-assessment
session (for example, when the learner’s face is not clearly
visible by the camera), such situation is bound to happen
frequently.
Therefore, the choice to develop an e-assessment architec-
ture that heavily relies on biometry without defining clear
boundaries with respect to privacy is an eloquent illustration
of the biases of a technology, introduced by the plan that here
consists in collecting a large amount of sensitive and private
data to first and foremost ensure learners’ authentication. The
main purpose of such plan is to provide the e-assessment
systemwith a credibility on par with face to face examination,
at the cost of serious privacy issues.
VI. ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS FOR TeSLA
A. PRIVACY-PRESERVING SCHEMES
Two additional enhancements of the TeSLA architecture
towards improved privacy features relies on the use of anony-
mous certification and malleable signatures.
As described in [15], [16], anonymous certification allows
us to perform privacy-friendly access control, in order to
certify that users are allowed to access a resource because
they own some attributes required by the verifier, without
revealing their identity. As explained in Section IV-C, given
the very principle of assessments, where learners receive
personalized grades, it is necessary to identify each learner
taking an assessment, whether through their true identity or a
pseudonymzed identifier. For that reason, anonymous certi-
fication cannot replace the authentication scheme deployed
in TeSLA. However, anonymous certification can be applied
in a few other ways. First, it can be used as the main access
control scheme for the pages hosting course material on
the VLE. Indeed, the VLE has theoretically no need of the
learners identity to decide whether they should have access
to the course material or not. The only information possibly
required by the VLE is:
• whether the student is enrolled at the university giving
the course
• whether the student has registered for the course
These two items correspond to the two attributes that
would be checked in the context of anonymous certification.
By doing so, it would be not be technically possible for
the VLE to track the learners’ activity, and to profile the
learners according to their hours of activity, the frequency of
their access to the course material, etc., hence significantly
improving the learners’ privacy.
Another way to integrate anonymous certification into the
TeSLA architecture consists in anonymizing the post pro-
cessing of completed e-assignments. Indeed, as described
in Section IV-B, after a learner takes an e-assessment,
the assignment is sent to various external instruments,
that perform anti-cheating post processings such as check-
ing whether the assignment contains plagiarism. However,
if the assignment is sent along with the TeSLA ID of
the learner, it becomes technically possible for the instru-
ments to keep track of a learner’s data over time, as well
as to correlate the data, for example in order to per-
form a more in-depth analysis for learners who happened
to raise suspicions of cheating according to the results
of other instruments. In the case where anonymous cer-
tification is used instead, relying on the aforementioned
attributes, it becomes impossible for instruments to perform
such tracking and correlation, hence enhancing the learners’
privacy.
In terms of malleable signatures, we can envision the adap-
tation of the TeSLA architecture towards the combination
of anonymization and sanitization. Similar approaches exist
in the literature, in order to enforce lifelogging protection
schemes [22], i.e., environments expected to record informa-
tion about everyday lives of users via smart devices. Similarly
to TeSLA, lifelogging environments involve the collection
of large datasets, including sensitive information about users
interacting with smart devices such as personal assistants,
mobile cellphones, and Internet-connected watches [30]. This
can lead to very serious privacy risks of personal data dis-
closure, as these data can be exploited in isolation, as well
as combining the information generated between several of
these devices.
Malleable signatures are mathematical construction that
allow a designated party, the sanitizer, to modify given
parts of a ciphertext, created by a signer, in a way that
allows the modifications in a controlled way. The signer
divides the signed information into several chunks or blocks,
and provides a subset of them to the sanitizer. The subset,
representing the series of admissible modifications, allows
the sanitizer to modify given parts of a previously signed
datum, while keeping the resulting signature still valid,
under the public key of the signer. The scheme can sat-
isfy privacy properties such as unlinkability, i.e., making
unfeasible to the involving parties to distinguish between
the initial source of data and the sanitized one [3]. The
combination of malleable signatures and anonymous certi-
fication can also be used in order to handle record link-
age attacks, while maintaining the utility of the data being
processed [8].
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B. TRUST AND TRANSPARENCY
In terms of trust, enhanced features beyond learners’ privacy
can also be added to future releases of the architecture. A sys-
tem like TeSLA, where learners have to take e-assessments
under strict anti-cheating countermeasures, requires a high
degree of trust from learners in order to be widely deployed
and accepted as a legitimate assessment tool. TeSLA should
provide public guarantees that its claims regarding privacy
and security are met, meaning that TeSLA is as transparent as
possible with respect to personal data management processes.
Though it is not directly related to security and privacy,
TeSLA should also ensure transparency regarding the anti-
cheating decision processes, and let learners know how these
decisions are made while informing them of possible resorts
at their disposal in case of false positive detection.
However, the choice of biometric-based authentication for
learners who are taking e-assessments entails other issues.
Firstly, the biometric samples are collected from the learner’s
computer, which by definition has no guarantee whatsoever
regarding security. Even if the samples are not meant to be
stored on the learner’s computer, the risk of personal data theft
at this point is independent from the TeSLA architecture, but
is induced by the choice to rely on biometry. As such, it should
be taken into account for further improvement of the TeSLA
system. Secondly, even though the biometric samples are
anonymized before they are sent to the TeSLA instruments,
it may be better not to send such sensitive data to TeSLA at
all, and decentralize Trusted Third Parties (TTPs) as much
as possible. The role of TeSLA is to offer a specific service,
namely the possibility to take e-assessments. It does not, and
could not act as a TTP. In the current configuration, what
happens to the biometric samples depends on how TeSLA is
managed. With a TTP, which would have no specific connec-
tion to TeSLA or to the academic institutions, there would be
a dedicated entity whose explicit role would be to guarantee
the treatment of these sensitive data, independently of the
current TeSLA policy. Notice that anonymous certification
will benefit of such a TTP-decentralization, as well.
To sum up, we consider that improving trust and privacy in
TeSLA requires further de-centralization of its fundamental
choices, in order to offer the best guarantees to both learners
and instructors. Even if the use of biometry is maintained as
it is nowadays in TeSLA, extending current TTP elements,
such as the TeSLA Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and
the underlying Certification Authorities (CAs), would be a
significant step in this direction.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have addressed the influence of conception paradigms
on data protection in virtual learning environments such as
Moodle. We have argued that new e-learning environments
may alter the relationship between students and academic
knowledge, if they are not properly conceived. E-learning
environments can potentially be used to track the students,
profile their habits, and retrieve personal data. We have used
as use case the recent advances of a EU project called TeSLA,
which promotes the use of an e-assessment framework to
remotely assess students, i.e., by reducing physical student-
teacher. We have illustrated our analysis by examine how the
design choices impact the efficiency and legal compliance of
personal data protection means. We have also proposed some
alternative designs that could lead to significant improve-
ments in these matters.
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